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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
STANLEY E. GOTSCHALL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870294 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a jury conviction of Second Degree 
Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (1978), the Honorable David E. Roth, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court err in refusing to dismiss a 
prospective juror for cause who initially expressed 
misunderstanding of the burden of proof but who later agreed to 
apply the appropriate standard? 
2. Did the lower court properly admit evidence of 
defendant's prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence as evidence of defendant's motive, intent, and 
knowledge? 
3. Did defendant fail to properly cite to the record 
to support his factual allegations that evidence of the victim's 
character was improperly admitted and misrepresent the facts, 
thus precluding a proper review of this argument? 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on negligent homicide as a lesser included offense under the 
facts of this case? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 404(a) & (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-206(1) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 
1975 ch.); 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(4) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 
1978 ch.). 
The text of these statutes and rules is set forth in 
the corresponding argument portion sof this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Stanley E. Gotschall ("Pete"), was charged 
with second degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978). A jury found defendant guilty 
of second degree murder on August 4, 1987. He was sentenced on 
August 4, 1987 to serve a term of not less than five years and 
which may be for life at the Utah State Prison. The Notice of 
Appeal was filed on August 20, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 17, 1987 at approximately 2:00 a.m., defendant, 
Stanley HPeteH Gotschall struck Don Miller multiple times with 
the thick end of a pool cue at the Horseshoe Lounge and Showroom, 
killing him (R. 231-33; 274-75). The obvious death blow was to 
the base of the skull, probably severing the vertebral artery and 
causing massive subarachnoid hemorrhage (R. 229-31). Another 
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blow to the back of and behind the right ear caused a skull 
fracture (R. 234-35). Eyewitnesses agree that all but one blow 
was struck after the victim was motionless on the floor (R. 275, 
312). 
Stanley "Pete" Gotschall was tried before a jury on 
July 30, 1987, and was convicted of second degree murder, a first 
degree felony, on August 4, 1987 (R. 81). Defendant appealed his 
conviction on August 13, 1987 (R. 98). Background facts 
pertinent to the issues on appeal are as follows: 
On May 16, 1987, Sandra Donaldson and others entered 
the Round-Up Bar and Cafe before leaving to fish (R. 274). She 
had seen defendant previously in this establishment and 
understood that he managed the cafe (R. 405-06). At about 3:00 
p.m. defendant approached Mrs. Donaldson and told her "that [she] 
was so ugly he would be doing [her] a favor if he bashed [her] 
head in with his attitude adjustor" (R. 406-07). Mrs. Donaldson 
further testified that she was aware that defendant called the 
baseball bat that he was swinging at the time, his "attitude 
adjustor" (R. 408). 
Later that same evening, defendant again entered the 
Round-Up and spoke to Veda Hadden, the bartender (R. 411). In 
this conversation, defendant remarked that he would have liked to 
bash in the head of a previous bartender with a baseball bat (R. 
412). Ms. Hadden further testified that defendant left the 
Round-Up at 1:35 a.m., approximately one half hour before the 
victim's death (R. 413). 
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Debra L. Adams, who was with defendant at the Round-Up 
Lounge, testified that they went to the Horseshoe Lounge around 
1:30 a.m. (R. 257). The victim, Don Miller, arrived shortly 
thereafter (R. 257). Although Mr. Miller arrived with a girl, 
she left with another patron (R. 258). At this point, defendant, 
Ms. Adams, Mr. Miller, Robin Bancroft, and Ray Loos were seated 
at the bar (R. 259). 
Robin Bancroft tipped over her beer, and used a bar 
towel to wipe up the mess (R. 337). When she attempted to throw 
the bar towel back to the bartender, she missed and hit Debra 
Adams (R. 338). Debra testified that Robin apologized (R. 261). 
However, defendant walked up behind Ray and hit him (R. 261). 
When Ray turned around to confront his attacker, Don Miller 
intervened (R. 262). Mr. Miller told defendant to "mellow out" 
(R. 262). Following this incident defendant ceased his attack, 
Mr. Miller returned to his seat at the bar, and Mr. Loos and Mr. 
Bancroft left the Lounge (R. 342-43). 
The bartender followed Loos and Bancroft to the door 
and locked it because it was approximately 2:00 a.m., closing 
time (R. 263). The bartender, Laurie Child, returned to the bar, 
and Mr. Miller asked for another beer (R. 374). When Ms. Child 
refused his request because it was past closing time; Mr. Miller 
knocked his empty beer bottle off of the bar (R. 374). Ms. Child 
again refused to give him another beer and replaced the empty 
bottle, which Mr. Miller again knocked off the bar (R. 374). Ms. 
Child testified that this argument was not an angry dispute, and 
that she and Mr. Miller were good friends (R. 375). 
After Mr. Miller knocked the bottle on the floor for 
the second time, defendant approached him and started screaming 
that it was his bar and Mr. Miller was not to behave that way (R. 
266). Defendant began threatening Mr. Miller with bodily harm, 
while Mr. Miller encouraged defendant to "mellow out" (R. 267). 
It then appeared that defendant was heading out the door; but 
before he exited, he stopped and came back into the bar toward 
Mr. Miller (R. 270). Defendant picked up a pool stick and 
started swinging it (R. 273). Defendant hit Mr. Miller, who had 
his back turned to defendant, on the head (R. 273). Mr. Miller 
fell to the floor and defendant continued hitting him (R. 275). 
shortly thereafter another patron left to call the police (R. 
278). 
The police arrested defendant approximately one hour 
later (R. 529). After reading defendant his Miranda warnings, 
Officer Sandberg took a statement which was admitted as State's 
Exhibit 11 (R. 248). In this statement, which was read to the 
jury upon defendant's request, defendant claimed that he hit Mr. 
Miller in self-defense (R. 489). 
During the selection of the jury, Mr. Hundel, a 
prospective juror, made statements which evidenced his lack of 
understanding of the concepts of burden of proof and defendant's 
right not to testify (R. 149-52). Defendant moved that Hundel be 
dismissed for cause (R. 154). After further questioning of Mr. 
Hundel, the Court denied defendant's challenge for cause (R. 
155). However, Mr. Hundel did not sit as a member of the jury 
because he was dismissed by one of defendant's peremptory 
challenges (R. 155-56). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court did not err in refusing to dismiss a 
prospective juror for cause and requiring defendant to exercise a 
peremptory challenge in order to excuse the venireman. The court 
also properly allowed evidence of prior bad acts to show 
defendant's motive, intent, and knowledge under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 404(b). 
Defendant's failure to properly cite to the record and 
to explain the facets of his legal argument supporting his claim 
that evidence of the victim's character was improperly admitted 
render this point largely unreviewable. In attempting to resolve 
the ambiguity of this point, the State submits that evidence of 
character was not improperly admitted. 
The Court properly refused to include instructions of 
negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of second degree 
murder according to the facts of this case, as viewed most 
favorably for the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO DISMISS A PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR FOR CAUSE. 
Defendant claims that it was prejudicial error for the 
court to refuse to dismiss a prospective juror, Mr. Hundel, for 
cause; thus requiring defendant to exercise one of his peremptory 
challenges in order to excuse the venireman. Specifically, 
defendant contends that Mr. Hundel failed to grasp the principle 
that an accused does not have an affirmative burden to prove his 
innocence, and that a defendant need not testify unless he 
chooses to do so. (Defendant's brief, at 9). The court 
properly denied defendant's challenge for cause and defendant's 
subsequent use of his peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Hundel 
did not result in prejudicial error. 
Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause 
when it becomes evident: 
That a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging. 
This Court has stated, on the other hand, that only those jurors 
who hold "strong and deep impressions" demonstrating a closed 
mind and an unwillingness to apply the law should be excused for 
cause. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984). In this 
case, the prospective juror did not demonstrate such a 
disposition. 
Initially, the concepts of burden of proof and of a 
defendant's constitutional right not to testify are legal 
doctrines that are occasionally difficult for the layman to grasp 
without an explanation of the practical application. The record 
shows that Mr. Hundel did not understand these concepts when 
defense counsel began her questioning. Sensing this, Judge Roth 
clarified these concepts. The dialogue in question commenced as 
follows: 
Ms. Gorman: I only have a few questions 
also. Could all of you keep an 
open mind until all the evidence 
is in? Could all of you do 
that? Or would you be making up 
your mind halfway through after 
the State was done? 
Okay. Do any of you have a 
problem with the fact that as 
Mr. Gotschall sits here today he 
is innocent? Do any of you have 
a problem with the fact because 
a person is charged with a 
crime, you have the propensity 
to think he probably did it? 
Anybody think that? 
Any of you disagree with the 
fact that because he is here 
charged, he is anything else 
than innocent? Do you have any 
problems with that? 
And just one last question. 
Would you, after hearing the 
State's side of the evidence—I 
guess I should explain, the 
prosecution will go first. They 
bring on their side. And then 
after that, it is the defendant 
could present evidence. Would 
any of you have a problem if, 
after the State offered their 
evidence, would you expect the 
defendant to offer his? 
What would any of you think 
if the defendant didn't offer 
any evidence? Would you want to 
hear his version? Okay, What 
if he didn't offer a version, 
would you hold the State to 
their burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Could you do 
that without hearing the 
defendant's version of the 
facts? 
Mr. Hundel: I think it would be difficult to 
decide. 
The Court: The questions are coming in a 
form I am not sure the Jury can 
respond to appropriately. If you 
will permit me to Instruct the 
Jurors that it is always the 
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burden on the State to prove the 
guilt of the defendant beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If they can do 
that. The defendant has no 
obligation to present a defense. 
He has no obligation to testify 
if he doesn't want to. And you 
would be instructed that you are 
not to hold that against him. 
And you must still judge the 
State's case on its own merits. 
And unless the State has proven 
him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you will find the 
defendant not guilty. If any of 
you quarrel with that law— 
Gorman: Mr. Hundel, you indicated you 
might have a problem. What 
would that be? 
Hundel: I was just stating a fact. The 
State presents their case, and 
the defendant has no case at 
all. I don't know, it wouldn't 
seem like, you know, a fair 
trial. Naturally the man wants 
to defend his innocence if he is 
innocent. 
Gorman: Do you think a man has to defend 
his innocence, or the State has 
to prove he is guilty? 
Hundel: Somebody has to do something. I 
mean it can't be in limbo. 
Gorman: Can't be what? 
Hundel: Can't be in limbo. The State 
has to present a case enough to 
prosecute, or the defendant has 
to present a case enough to make 
him look innocent. I mean it 
can't be like hanging in mid-
air. Somebody has got to do 
something. You know what I 
mean? 
Gorman: How about after you heard the 
States' evidence, and you 
weren't—you have some questions 
about a couple of elements. 
What would your verdict be? 
Mr. Daines: Your Honor, I object to asking 
for the verdict. 
The Court: I am not sure that's an 
appropriate question. 
Mr. Hundel: I couldn't answer the question. 
The Court: If you heard the State's evidence 
and were not convinced of the 
defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and even though 
the defendant presented no 
defense would you be able to find 
him not guilty? 
Mr. Hundel: I don't know. I don't know. I 
would have to—I don't know. 
(R. 449-52). Based on the foregoing, defendant contends that Mr. 
Hundel refused to apply the burden of proof to the State and that 
he should have been dismissed for cause. However, the record 
merely evidences understandable confusion about this concept. 
Defendant points out that at one point Mr. Hundel 
stated that "the defendant has to present a case enough to make 
him look innocent." (R. 152; Defendant's brief at 9.) However, 
this response was made to an inartful compound question which 
asked "Do you think a man has to defend his innocence, or the 
State has to prove he is guilty?" (R. 152.) A review of the 
entire record surrounding this discussion, and encompassing the 
statement in question, reveals that the prospective juror simply 
felt that some procedure must be taken to further the case—his 
confusion was simply as to whether it should be the State or 
defendant who needed to move forward. 
The State does not assert that Mr. Hundel came into the 
courtroom with a complete understanding of the concept. However, 
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upon further questioning, his misunderstanding of the law and his 
willingness to comply with the judge's instructions is evident: 
The Court: Mr. Hundel, I don't want to leave 
any loose ends with how you feel 
about this. Let me walk through 
the process and see if we have a 
misunderstanding. You do 
understand it is the State's 
burden to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
Mr. Hundel: Yes, I do. 
The Court: Do you have any problem with 
that? 
Mr. Hundel: No, 
The Court: 
Mr. Hundel: 
If the State does not prove the 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
would you be able to find the 
defendant not guilty? If the 
State doesn't prove the case. 
Well, the defendant has to prove 





He doesn't have to. The law 
doesn't require that. 
The law doesn't require that? 
The burden is on the State 
throughout the trial to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Do you accept that? 
Mr. Hundel: Yeah. 
The Court: Would you require the defendant 
to present a defense even though 
the State had not proved guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt in your 
mind? 
Not if he don't have to, I guess 
I wouldn't require it. 
(R. 152-53). 
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During this questioning, it became apparent that the 
prospective juror did misunderstand the law when he stated that 
"the defendant has to prove himself innocent" (R. 152). However, 
the court quickly corrected this misconception and then 
requestioned Mr. Hundel to ascertain whether he understood the 
burden of proof principle and would not require defendant to 
offer evidence to support his innocence. Once educated on the 
meaning of the concept of innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Mr. Hundel agreed to apply the concept to 
defendant. 
Even if this juror should have been excused, the issue 
of prejudice remains. This Court has previously held that is 
reversible error to force a defendant to use a peremptory 
challenge to eliminate a juror that should have been excused for 
cause. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987), and cases 
cited therein. Recently, however, in Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. 
Ct. 2273 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that "where 
juror who should have been excused for cause was removed by 
defendant's peremptory challenge, any claim that the jury was not 
impartial was required to focus, not on the excused juror, but on 
the jurors who ultimately sat." The Court reasoned that as long 
as the jury which actually sat for the case was impartial, it is 
unimportant that defendant was forced to use a peremptory 
challenge to excuse a potentially biased juror. Should this 
Court determine that Mr. Hundel should have been excused for 
cause, the State requests this Court to reevaluate its previous 
decisions in light of Ross. Defendant in this case has not 
claimed that jurors who actually sat on his case were anything 
but fair and impartial. While he may have wished, for strategy 
reasons, to eliminate a juror other than Mr. Hundel, unless a 
juror who sat prejudiced him by acting unfairly or partially, 
there should be no reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS UNDER RULE 404(b) of 
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE AS EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIVE, INTENT, AND KNOWLEDGE. 
State v. Pacheo, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), this Court 
held that: 
Evidence of prior crimes is admissible if the 
evidence is relevant to prove a specific 
element of the crime for which a defendant is 
on trial. The evidence is not admissible if 
it is relevant solely to show a defendant's 
propensity to commit a crime. 
712 at 185. See also State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 
1985); State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, during a preliminary conference, Judge 
Roth considered the question of admissibility of statements made 
by defendant the evening before the alleged incident (R. 161). 
Although counsel for defendant strenuously objected, Judge Roth 
determined that the evidence proposed by the State would show 
modus operandi, and was thus admissible (R. 162). The Court 
further stated: 
I really don't think it is a close question 
personally under these circumstances. We are 
talking about the evening prior to a homicide 
where a person is saying he has this 
propensity and this history of using clubs on 
people [sic] head. And the same night he 
uses a club or pool stick on somebody's head. 
I think it is evidence as to his state of 
mind leading up to the crime. Evidence 
bearing on his intent at the time, lack of 
mistake, motive. It fits. It is 
prejudicial, sure it is. I think the 
relevance outweighs the prejudicial effect 
(R. 163) 
Had the testimony of witnesses Sandra Donaldson and 
Veda Hadden been used simply to disgrace defendant and to 
establish a tendency or propensity toward criminal acts, it would 
have severely prejudiced defendant. However, in accordance with 
the court's favorable ruling the evidence questioned was properly 
admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
states: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Sandra Donaldson testified that she saw defendant less than 
twelve hours before the death of the victim in this case. Upon 
questioning, the following dialogue took place: 
Q: Where were you when you were approached? 
A: I was coming up the stairs from the 
restaurant into the bar. 
Q: And what, if anything, did the defendant 
say to you? 
A: He told me that I was so ugly he would be 
doing me a favor if he bashed my head in 
with his attitude adjuster. 
Q: Did he have anything in his hands at that 
time? 
A: He had a wooden baseball bat in his 
hands. 
Q: Does this appear to be the bat, Ms. 
Gorman—or you were referring to? 
A: It looks like it. 
Q: At least sizewise this is what it was? 
A: It looked bigger when he was swinging it, 
but I am sure that's it. 
Q: Did he call it an attitude adjustor? 
A: Yes, he did. 
(R. 407-08). 
Another witness, Veda Hadden, testified that she also 
had a conversation with defendant several hours later, but still 
before the victim's death. During questioning, Ms. Hadden 
reported: 
A: Well, he [defendant] had told me that he 
was mad at the bartender previous, okay, 
another bartender that worked there. 
And, okay, he had had a conflict with 
this man. And the night this conflict 
happened, I took the other guy home, 
okay, to get him away from Pete and from 
the police that were there. 
Q: But what, if anything, did Pete say at 
this time? 
A: He said to me you are lucky that you took 
Bob home that night. And I said what do 
you mean. He said you are lucky to run 
the yellow—I can't say it. 
Q: I am talking did he say anything 
generally about anything that he liked to 
do with baseball bats? 
A: He said he would like to bash his head 
in. 
Q: This particular head? 
A: He said he would beat his head . . . . 
Referring to this testimony, defendant contends that 
"such evidence tended to show the defendant had the propensity to 
commit other wrongs or crimes and was grossly prejudicial. Such 
evidence, as a matter of law, did not show a common scheme or 
plan" (Defendant's Brief at 15). On the contrary, purpose of the 
elicited testimony was not to convince the jury that defendant 
had assaulted Mrs, Donaldson or had previously attempted to 
assault Mrs. Donaldson or had previously attempted to assault 
another bartender. Rather, this evidence shows defendant's state 
of mind shortly preceding the attack on the victim in this case; 
his aggressive behavior and pattern of picking fights throughout 
the day and evening preceding his confrontation with the victim 
(which, ironically, occurred when the victim attempted to 
intervene in another altercation initiated by defendant (R. 
261)); and his use of a club-like instrument in an offensive 
manner. The evidence directly supports the State's position 
that contrary to defendant's initial claim of self-defense, he 
entertained the intent to initiate a fight and to use the pool 
stick as an offensive weapon, and the knowledge that in using the 
weapon on the victim he would cause death. Each of these facts 
go directly to the element material for a conviction of second 
degree murder. 
Defendant suggests that "during the trial, the jury was 
presented a picture of Stanley Gotschall as a cantankerous man 
who had made repeated threats to various people that he would hit 
them with his "'attitude adjustor,' a baseball bat" (Defendant's 
Brief at 16). This allegation suggests that the State paraded 
before the jury a lengthy account of various occurrences over a 
general extended period of time. Admittedly, such a composition 
of experiences might do little more than disgrace defendant and 
show some criminal propensity. This limited use of such evidence 
is improper. State v. Wells# 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979). However, 
the evidence in this case is much more than a compilation of 
unrelated bad acts. The incidents related by Donaldson and 
Hadden were not simply examples of misconduct given to sully the 
character of defendant. They were specific acts which occurred 
within twelve hours before the victim's death which suggest that 
defendant's actions were intentional, motivated by anger and done 
with knowledge of the result. Under Rule 404(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, evidence of such acts is properly admissible 
as an exception to the general inadmissibility of character 
evidence. As such, the questioned evidence did not unfairly 
prejudice defendant and no error was committed. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO CITE TO THE RECORD 
ON APPEAL TO SUPPORT THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
UPON WHICH HE BASES HIS LEGAL ARGUMENTS, AND 
A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AMBIGUOUSLY REFERRED 
TO BY DEFENDANT DOES NOT SUPPORT HIS 
ARGUMENT, DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
Defendant alleges that the State introduced evidence of 
the character of the victim in violation of Rule 404(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence because defendant had not opened the door 
for such evidence (Defendant's Brief at 20-21). However, 
defendant cites to the record at 158 as the sole support for his 
allegation. This single page reference is to the beginning of a 
conversation between counsel and the Court in chambers about 
admitting character evidence. At this point, defendant did not 
object to the evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness 
(R. 158-61). The conversation countered around whether the state 
could put the evidence in before putting on defendant's statement 
that he hit Mr. Miller in self-defense. The situation was 
resolved when the state agreed to offer the defendant's statement 
claiming self-defense before offering the proposed character 
evidence and defense counsel agreed that this would be 
appropriate (R. 160-61). No further references to either the 
trial transcript or the record are made by defendant and it is 
not clear to what specific testimony defendant now objects. See 
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This court cannot 
rule on matters outside the trial court record). Under these 
circumstances, the Court should assume the correctness of the 
trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's conviction. Utah 
R. App. P. 24 (1985); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 
1983) (correctness of the trial court's judgment is assumed when 
counsel on appeal fails to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 
75(p)(2)(2)(d) (1977)—the rule that preceeded Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) (1985)); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 
1982). In that "[t]he burden of showing error is on the party 
who 6eeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 
1267 (Utah 1982), the State should not be put to the task of 
developing defendant's legal arguments by searching through the 
record and making reference thereto to support defendant's 
factual allegations. The obligation to direct the Court to 
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pertinent parts of the record falls upon defendant, not the 
State. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
succinctly provides: 
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order here indicated: 
• • • • 
(9) An argument. The argument shall 
contain the contentions of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented and the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on. 
However, in an effort to avoid the necessity of 
supplemental briefing, the statement made by defendant to the 
police concerning self-defense was the basis for admission of any 
character evidence regarding the victim's peaceful nature and any 
character evidence was, therefore, not a violation of Rule 
404(a). Officer Scott Sandberg, to whom defendant made the 
statement concerning self-defense, was called twice by the State 
and twice by defendant. Initially, the State questioned Sandberg 
in order to identify a photostatic copy of defendant's statement 
which was admitted, without objection, as State's Exhibit 11 (R. 
246). The State later recalled Officer Sandberg to admit 
additional exhibits (R. 414). No questions were asked on either 
of these occasions as to the specific substance of defendant's 
statement to the police or the character of the victim. 
The substance of defendant's statement was revealed 
later in the trial when the defense called Officer Sandberg to 
testify (R. 482). Using State's Exhibit 11, defendant asked 
Officer Sandberg to read aloud the statement which was made by 
defendant approximately two hours after the victim's death. In 
saying that this statement was improperly used at trial by the 
State in its case in chief, and only used by defendant in forced 
rebuttal, defendant has misrepresented the facts, (See 
Defendant's Brief at 21.) Defendant agreed that the statement 
would come in during the in-chambers discussion referred to above 
(R. 161). 
Barring further factual support or specific reference 
to the trial transcript or the record, defendant has not met his 
burden in presenting his allegation of the State's violation of 
Utah R. Evid. 404(a). Furthermore, an investigation of Officer 
Sandberg's testimony concerning the questioned statement shows no 
violation by the State and no prejudice to defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this Court 
established precise standards for determining the applicability 
of a proposed lesser included offense in the jury instructions. 
First, the trial court must "determine whether an offense is 
established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged." 
State v. Valarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986). If "the 
evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
explanations, the trial court must give the lesser included 
offense instruction if any one of the alternative interpretations 
provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense." ^d. 
The State admits that there are circumstances in which 
negligent homicide may appropriately be considered as a lesser 
included offense of second degree murder. See State v. Velarde, 
at 453. Therefore, the State does not argue with defendant 
concerning the first point of the Baker test. However, the State 
strongly disagrees with defendant's assertion that the second 
prong of the Baker analysis is also met in the instant case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1) (1978) defines Negligent 
Homicide as follows: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
"Criminal Negligence" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) 
(1978): 
A person engages in conduct: 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
In viewing the evidence most favorable to the 
defendant, the facts in this case do not lend themselves to a 
conviction of negligent homicide. Defendant stated during his 
testimony. 
_01 _ 
I hit him in the head. And I think I hit him 
again. When he went down, I started to kick 
him in the head, because I didn't know he was 
hurt. And I was—it has always been my 
policy when you have got somebody, you know 
that you are in an altercation with, if you 
can put them out—I say put them out of 
business. 
(R. 526). This statement demonstrates that defendant was not 
only cognizant of the probable effects of his actions, but, 
indeed, he desired to put the victim "out of business." The 
trial judge properly determined that there was no alternative 
interpretation that would permit the jury to acquit defendant of 
second degree murder and convict him of negligent homicide and 
thus properly refused to so instruct. 
Additionally, the fact that the jury did not choose to 
acquit defendant of second degree murder and convict him of the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter (an offense intermediate 
in level between second degree murder and negligent homicide) 
supports a conclusion that the absence of an instruction for 
negligent homicide did not prejudice defendant. The fact that 
the jury did not choose the lesser offense that was offered 
logically infers that the denial of an even lower level offense 
was, at most, non-prejudicial error, and the decision of the 
trial judge should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision of the 
trial court and uphold the conviction of second degree murder. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 27Y\ day of October, 
1988. 
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